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AbstrAct
The current study investigated the effects of a single- vs. multi-sentence stress induction 
paradigm on subjective ratings of discomfort, anxiety, and distress in a non-clinical sample. 
The Single-Sentence task required participants to write a sentence stating the hope that a 
loved one is involved in a car accident. The Multi-Sentence task required participants to 
write five sentences that added greater detail to the hypothetical accident. As predicted, 
both tasks were associated with an increase in the three dependent variables, suggesting 
that both served as stress induction procedures. Contrary to predictions, however, the 
Multi-Sentence Condition did not induce greater stress than the Single-Sentence Condition, 
although the former was associated with greater willingness to engage with thoughts of 
the accident and greater vividness of thoughts. In contrast, the Single-Sentence Condition 
was associated with stronger feelings of guilt and moral wrongness. The implications of 
the findings for existing stress induction procedures are discussed. 
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Clinical researchers have generated an array of experimental contexts for the 
investigation of various aspects of mental distress, in the hope of improving our 
understanding and treatment of mental health issues (e.g., Hayes, Bisset, Korn, et al., 
1999; Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Existing methods of experimental 
stress induction employed as analogs of clinically relevant processes include: the 
CO2 challenge (e.g., Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004); the cold-pressor task 
(e.g., Keogh, Bond, Hanmer, & Tilston, 2005); brief electric shock (e.g., McMullen, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, Luciano, & Cochrane, 2008); and radiant heat 
induction (e.g., Kehoe, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Cochrane, & Stewart, 2007). 
These procedures have been used to investigate psychological processes, such as thought 
suppression, panic, and pain tolerance, as well as treatment susceptibility, including the 
use of acceptance-based protocols.
Although numerous studies of experimental stress induction have involved specific 
clinical samples, such as persons with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD; e.g., Purdon, 
Rowa, & Antony, 2005), an even greater number have investigated non-clinical populations 
(e.g., Mancini, D’Olimpio, & Cieri, 2004). For example, non-clinical samples have been 
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used to study aspects of OCD, such as intrusive thoughts and compulsive behaviors 
(e.g., Muris, Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach, & Campbell, 2001). Indeed, findings have 
highlighted the overlap of these processes between clinical and non-clinical populations. 
For example, Rachman and de Silva (1978) demonstrated that the content of intrusive 
thoughts in non-clinically anxious individuals is indistinguishable from that experienced 
by persons with OCD. Overall, Gibbs (1996) proposed that the volume of non-clinical 
samples in anxiety research, in particular, had contributed directly to the expansion of 
knowledge in that area. 
One of the shortest forms of stress induction was employed by Rachman, Shafran, 
Mitchell, Trant, and Teachman (1996) in an attempt to analog the process of thought-
action fusion (TAF), believed to be central to OCD. Specifically, participants were asked 
to insert the name of a close relative or friend into the sentence “I hope [name] is in a 
car accident” and then say the sentence aloud, while trying to visualise the hypothetical 
scene. The findings indicated that the experimental manipulation increased anxiety, guilt, 
and feelings of moral wrongness, as measured on visual analog scales (VASs), which 
the researchers interpreted as key features of TAF. 
Numerous studies have replicated these effects with non-clinical samples and 
highlighted the utility of the single sentence stress induction procedure in the study of 
anxiety processes. For example, both van den Hout, Kindt, Weiland, and Peters (2002), 
and Bocci and Gordon (2007) employed the procedure to investigate the effects of 
neutralizing behavior. In addition, Marcks and Woods (2007) used it to explore the 
relationship between TAF beliefs and thought suppression, while Zucker, Craske, Barrios, 
and Holgiun (2002) investigated the utility of educational interventions in offsetting 
anxiety. Overall, the data from these studies bears strong similarity to Rachman et 
al.’s (1996) original findings in demonstrating that the single sentence stress induction 
procedure successfully elevates subjective ratings of anxiety, guilt, and moral wrongness 
in non-clinical samples. 
The robust nature of these outcomes is perhaps remarkable given the brevity 
and simplicity of Rachman et al.’s (1996) experimental manipulation (i.e., a single 
sentence). The current research attempted to explore this issue by examining the potential 
impact of adding more sentences on the stress induction effects. Consistent with this 
simple aim, the current hypothesis predicted that a Multi-Sentence Condition would be 
associated with larger increases in measures of stress induction than a Single-Sentence 
Condition that resembled the original manipulation. This hypothesis was based on the 
fact that a longer manipulation would generate more vividness of the scene and thus 
increase participants’ negative appraisal of the hypothetical accident. Bearing in mind 
the significance of the single sentence paradigm in OCD research, this experiment did 
not attempt to replicate any previous investigation of TAF. The task was implemented 
as a stress induction procedure outside and separate from the arena of thought-action 
fusion, with the simple aim of investigating its utility in inducing subjective anxiety, 
discomfort or distress in a non-clinical sample.
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Method
Participants
Ninety volunteers (43 male and 47 female) participated in the current experiment. 
All were aged between 18 and 23, were undergraduates from the National University 
of Ireland Maynooth (NUIM), and were able to drive. A number of exclusion criteria 
resulted in 26 participants not completing the experiment. Any individuals who reported 
that they had recently lost a loved one in an accident were excluded from participation 
because the experiment involved asking participants to imagine such an event. In addition, 
individuals who reported significant mental health issues (e.g., anxiety) that might be 
adversely affected by participation were also excluded. This yielded a final sample of 
64 participants (29 male and 35 female, Mean age= 19.96 years) assigned randomly 
across two experimental conditions -Single-Sentence and Multi-Sentence.
Measures
The study involved an Experimental Screening Questionnaire (ESQ) and two self-
report measures -the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ) and the Philadelphia 
Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS). These measures were designed to assess participants’ pre-
experimental levels of acceptance and mindfulness in order to ensure balance across the 
two conditions. Because the experimental manipulation involved asking participants to 
imagine a loved one in a road traffic accident, the ESQ was designed to ascertain if 
such events had previously impacted upon potential participants (and to exclude those 
for whom this was the case).
 The AAQ is a standard measure of experiential avoidance (Bond et al., 2011). 
Scores on the seven items (e.g., “I’m afraid of my feelings”) are summed to generate a 
total for avoidance (maximum= 49, minimum= 7). The mean for a non-clinical sample 
has been reported at 17.34 (SD= 4.37), with a mean alpha coefficient of .84 (.78 -.88), 
and 12-month test-retest reliability of .79 (Bond et al., 2011). 
The PHLMS is a standard measure of mindfulness capabilities (Cardaciotto, 
Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008). This 20-item measure contained 10 items 
that assessed mindful awareness (e.g., “I am aware of what thoughts are passing through 
my mind”) and 10 that assessed mindful acceptance (e.g., “There are aspects of myself I 
don’t want to think about”). Total scores (across both sub-scales) range from 20 to 100. 
The mean for a non-clinical sample has been reported at 36.65 (SD= 4.93) and 30.19 
(SD= 5.84) on the awareness and acceptance scale, respectively. Internal consistency 
reliability analyses have yielded a Cronbach’s alpha level of 0.75 for awareness and 
0.82 for acceptance (Cardaciotto et al., 2008). 
Visual Analog Scale (VAS) ratings of discomfort, anxiety, and distress. Three 
dependent measures assessed participants’ current self-reported levels of discomfort, 
anxiety, and distress before and after the experimental manipulation. Each measure 
comprised of a VAS, on which participants placed an X from 0% (e.g., No Discomfort) 
to 100% (e.g., Very Much Discomfort).  
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Reactions Questionnaire. After the experimental manipulation, participants were 
presented with a short questionnaire to assess their reactions to writing and speaking 
about the hypothetical accident. The questionnaire consisted of five questions, each 
referring to willingness, vividness, believability, moral wrongness, or guilt (e.g., “Please 
rate how much guilt you feel after saying and writing the sentence”). Participants also 
responded to these questions by placing an X on a corresponding VAS (e.g., No Guilt) 
to 100% (e.g., Very Much Guilt).
Procedure
The current study comprised of four stages (Stages 1-4), always conducted in 
the same order.
Stage 1: Screening measures. Prior to commencement, participants completed the ESQ, 
PHLMS, and AAQ. During a short break, these measures were assessed for exclusion 
purposes. Where exclusion applied, participants were thanked and debriefed. All others 
proceeded immediately to the next stage.
Stage 2: Baseline VAS ratings. During Stage 2, participants completed the three baseline 
VAS ratings of discomfort, anxiety, and distress.
Stage 3: Experimental manipulation (Single-Sentence vs. Multi-Sentence Conditions). The 
experimental manipulation that comprised the Single-Sentence Condition was taken from 
previous research by Rachman et al. (1996). The Multi-Sentence task was developed 
for current purposes. Prior to each manipulation, all participants were asked to write 
down “the name of the person you care about most in the world.”
 Single-Sentence Condition. The Single-Sentence Condition primarily involved participants 
saying aloud and writing a potentially upsetting sentence about the involvement of a 
loved one in an accident. The instructions were as follows:
Ok, so when you’re ready we will begin. What is going to happen is that I am 
going to call out a sentence that I want you to repeat word for word. Once I 
read out the sentence, if you can, I want you to take a moment to imagine the 
scene it describes and then say the sentence with as much meaning as you can. 
Once you have said the sentence aloud, I want you to then write it down on 
the page in front of you. Now remember, if you don’t want to say the sentence 
or you want to stop writing it at any stage, you are completely free to do so. 
Just let me know and we will stop what we are doing and move onto the next 
part of the experiment. Is that ok with you? Do you have any questions at this 
point? (Participant affirms). Ok let’s begin. Here is the sentence: “I hope (name 
of loved one) dies in a car accident.”  
 Multi-Sentence Condition. The difference between the two conditions centered on the 
use of a more extended hypothetical accident story in the Multi-Sentence Condition. 
Specifically, participants were asked to repeat and write five sentences regarding the 
accident in an attempt to increase the vividness and impact of the exercise. In order 
for this to be realistic, participants in this condition were asked additional questions 
about the loved one (e.g., what is she/he doing today, what time would she/he be 
finished, etc.). This ensured the scenario was relevant and unique to each individual. 
Participants in the Multi-Sentence Condition were instructed as follows:
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Ok, so when you’re ready we will begin. What is going to happen is that I 
am going to call out five sentences and stop after each one. Once I read out 
the sentence, if you can, I want you to take a moment to imagine the scene it 
describes and then say the sentence with as much meaning as you can. Once you 
have said the sentence aloud, I want you to write it down on the page in front 
of you. When this is done, we will move onto the next sentence. So, I will say 
the sentence, you repeat it and you write it down. Now remember, if you don’t 
want to say any of the sentences or if you want to stop writing at any stage, 
you are completely free to do so. Just let me know and we will stop what we 
are doing and move onto the next part of the experiment. Is that ok with you? 
Do you have any questions at this point? (Participant affirms). Ok let’s begin. 
Here is the first sentence: 
“Today at X o’clock (name of loved one) is waiting for me to collect him/her 
(participant repeats and writes).
 She/he does not know that I am feeling very sleepy at the wheel of my car 
(participant repeats and writes).
 Just as I pull up, my eyes close and I lose control of the car (participant repeats 
and writes).
 My car speeds onto (name of loved one’s) side of the road and I hit him/her 
head on (participant repeats and writes).
 I hope (name of loved one) dies in the car accident (participant repeats and 
writes).”
Stage 4: Post-manipulation VAS ratings and Reactions Questionnaire. The post-manipulation 
VAS ratings were identical to Stage 2. In addition, Stage 4 involved presentation of 
the Reactions Questionnaire to assess participants’ reactions to saying and writing the 
sentence(s) about the hypothetical accident.
results
 
Three main investigations were central to the current research. The first examined 
the effect of the experimental manipulation (Single- or Multi-Sentence) on mean scores 
of discomfort, anxiety, and distress. The second determined whether the Multi-Sentence 
Condition would be associated with greater increases in participants’ discomfort, anxiety, 
and distress relative to the Single-Sentence Condition. The final investigation explored 
potential differences between the conditions in terms of participants’ reactions to the 
imaginary scenario. 
Participants in the two conditions did not differ significantly on the preexperimental 
measures of acceptance or mindfulness. Specifically, the mean and standard deviations 
for the AAQ for the Single-Sentence Condition was 16 (SD= 5.1) and 18 (SD= 6.2) for 
Multi-Sentence. The mean PHLMS score for the acceptance subscale was 29 (SD= 4.6) 
for the Single-Sentence Condition and 28 (SD= 8) for the Multi-Sentence. The mean 
for the awareness subscale was 33 (SD= 5.5) for the Single-Sentence and 34 (SD= 7.4) 
for the Multi-Sentence. Two independent samples t-tests confirmed that the conditions 
did not differ significantly on either measure (all p’s >.11).
Both the Single- and Multi-Sentence Conditions increased participants’ self-
reported levels of discomfort, anxiety, and distress. The mean VAS ratings for pre- and 
post-manipulation by condition in each of these dependent variables are presented in 
Figures 1, 2, and 3.
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The VAS ratings of discomfort at baseline were extremely low (i.e., all participants 
scored <11/100). This pattern changed for both conditions at post-manipulation (see 
Figure 1). A Mixed Between Within 2x2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed a 
highly significant main effect for time (Wilk’s Lambda= .45, F(1, 62)= 74.6, p <.0001, 
partial eta squared= .546), but not for condition (F(1, 62)= .727, p= .397, partial eta 
squared= .012). The interaction effect was also non-significant (Wilk’s Lambda= 1.0, 
F(1, 62)= .04, p= .84, partial eta squared= .001). 
The VAS ratings of anxiety were also extremely low at baseline (i.e., all <11/100). 
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Figure 1. Mean VAS Discomfort Ratings per 
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Figure 2.  Mean VAS Anxiety Ratings per 
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Figure 3.  Mean VAS Distress Ratings per Condition 
at Pre- and Post-Manipulation.
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again revealed a highly significant main effect for time (Wilk’s Lambda= .58, F(1, 
62)= 44.14, p <.0001, partial eta squared= .42), but not for condition (F(1, 62)= .173, 
p= .679, partial eta squared= .003), or the interaction effect (Wilk’s Lambda= 1.0, F(1, 
62)= .083, p= .774, partial eta squared= .001).
The VAS ratings of distress were again extremely low at baseline (i.e., all <9/100) 
and increased similarly after both manipulations (see Figure 3). A 2x2 ANOVA revealed 
a highly significant main effect for time (Wilk’s Lambda= .65, F(1, 62)= 33.4, p <.0001, 
partial eta squared= .35), but not for condition (F(1, 62)= .012, p= 9.15, partial eta 
squared= .000) or the interaction effect (Wilk’s Lambda= 1.00, F(1, 62)= .1, p= .75, 
partial eta squared= .002).
Participant ratings of their willingness to engage with thoughts about the imaginary 
accident were low to moderate (see Table 1). In particular, the ratings on Multi-Sentence 
were almost twice as high as Single-Sentence (54 vs. 27). An independent samples t-test 
indicated that this difference was highly significant [t (32)= -2.967, p= .006].
Ratings of the vividness of thoughts and images of the accident were also low to 
moderate (see Table 1). Again, Multi-Sentence ratings were much higher than Single-
Sentence (52 vs. 30). An independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was 
also highly significant [t (62)= -3.234, p= .002].
Believability ratings of the accident were moderate for both conditions (see Table 
1), but marginally higher for Multi-Sentence (36 compared with 25). An independent 
samples t-test indicated that this difference approached significance [t (62)= -1.726, p= 
.089].
Ratings of guilt generated by writing and saying the sentence(s) about the 
imaginary accident were moderate (see Table 1), although Multi-Sentence was lower (41 
vs. 51). An independent samples t-test indicated that this difference was not significant 
[t (62)= 1.213, p= .230].
Ratings of how morally wrong it felt to write and say the sentence(s) were 
moderate (see Table 1), with Multi-Sentence lower (48 compared with 60). An independent 
samples t-test indicated that this difference was not significant [t (61)= 1.325, p= .190].











Please rate your level of willingness to engage with your 
thoughts of the accident. 27.06 (26.00) 53.79 (26.53) .006 
Please rate how vivid your thoughts and images were of the 
car accident. 30.16 (28.35) 52.19 (26.09) .002 
Please rate how believable the accident scenario was to you. 25.03 (25.40) 36.37 (27.15) .089 
Please rate how much guilt you feel after saying and writing 
the sentence (s). 51.45 (33.19) 41.45 (32.73) .230 
Please rate how morally wrong you felt it was to write or say 
the sentence (s). 59.59 (35.33) 48.03 (33.9) .190 
Notes: M= average; SD= Standard Deviation; p values: Statistical significance. 
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A series of bi-variate correlations were conducted using the Pearson product-
moment correlation coefficient. Overall, comparisons between the screening measures 
and the dependent variables at baseline yielded mostly weak and non-significant results, 
with two exceptions. First, there was a significant positive correlation between the AAQ 
and distress [r= .285, p <.05]. Although non-significant, there was also a small positive 
correlation between the AAQ and both discomfort [r= .065, p= .61] and anxiety [r= 
.055, p= .67]. In short, more avoidance was associated with more distress, discomfort, 
and anxiety. Second, there was a significant positive correlation between the awareness 
scale of the PHLMS and distress [r= .276, p <.05]. This indicated that more awareness 
was moderately associated with more distress. Although non-significant, there was also 
a small negative correlation between awareness and both discomfort [r= -.102, p= 
.422] and anxiety [r= -.020, p= .877]. This indicated that more awareness was weakly 
associated with less discomfort, and anxiety. Again although non-significant, there was 
a weak positive correlation between the acceptance scale of the PHLMS and all three 
dependent variables (discomfort [r= .175, p= .166], anxiety [r= .027, p= .834], and 
distress [r= .226, p= .072]). That is, more acceptance was weakly associated with more 
discomfort, anxiety, and distress. 
The data from the screening measures indicated that participants did not differ 
preexperimentally on their propensities towards acceptance or mindfulness. At baseline, 
all were very low in discomfort, anxiety, and distress, but both conditions showed 
significant increases on all three ratings at post-manipulation. However, the research 
prediction that the Multi-Sentence Condition would be asscociated with greater increases 
in the dependent variables was not confirmed. Nonetheless, results from the Reactions 
Questionnaire indicated some differences between conditions. Specifically, Multi-Sentence 
participants were significantly more willing to engage with their thoughts about the accident 
and had significantly more vivid thoughts than those in the Single-Sentence Condition. 
The former participants also reported higher thought believability, with a difference 
approaching significance. Levels of participant guilt or feelings of moral wrongness did 
not differ significantly across conditions, although participants in the Single-Sentence 
Condition were higher on each. Correlation analyses between the screening measures 
and dependent variables at baseline yielded some significant and interesting results. 
Specially, more avoidance was associated with more distress, discomfort, and anxiety. 
More awareness was associated with less discomfort and anxiety. And, more acceptance 
was associated with more distress, discomfort, and anxiety.
discussion
The existing literature contains a range of experimental stress induction procedures 
that differ primarily in terms of the stimuli or situations used to evoke affect and/or 
the types of responses measured (e.g., physiological, subjective, etc.). These differences 
make comparisons of the relative utility of procedures difficult. However, the current 
findings bear some similarity with existing evidence in terms of both the single-sentence 
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stress induction paradigm and in terms of more-established procedures such as the CO2 
challenge and radiant heat induction. 
The literature contains only a small number of studies that have investigated the 
stress induction potential of the single-sentence procedure. The current work sought 
to extend research by Rachman et al. (1996) who were the first to publish on the use 
of this methodology and its impact on subjective anxiety. Those results indicated that 
anxiety increased by 53 VAS points, a much larger increase than that recorded here (i.e., 
a mean increase of 21 points across both conditions). A critical difference, however, 
across the two studies concerns the use of a self-selected sample high in TAF in the 
original work, compared with a random sample of undergraduates presently. In contrast, 
the current anxiety outcomes are more in keeping with the findings reported by van 
den Hout et al. (2002) and by Zucker et al. (2002), whose mean increases in anxiety 
(for the control groups) was approx. 29 and 27 VAS points, respectively. In addition, 
the present results are in line with the increase in subjective anxiety reported by Bocci 
and Gordon (2007), which was approx. 36 VAS points.
The current increase in anxiety is also in line with findings reported by Levitt et 
al.  (2004), who measured subjective anxiety in a clinical sample of persons with panic 
disorder and recorded a rating of approx. 40 (using conversion from likert scale) after a 
CO2 challenge. The post-task anxiety ratings for the current study were approximately 
29 for both conditions. Similarly, Karekla, Forsyth, and Kelly (2004) measured subjec-
tive distress in a non-clinical sample (with low avoidance as measured on the AAQ) 
and recorded an increase of 36 subjective units of distress from before to after a CO2 
challenge. The increase recorded in the current study for distress was approximately 
16. In addition, Kehoe (2008) measured subjective discomfort in a non-clinical sample 
using radiant heat induction. Participants’ mean discomfort rating was 55 after the task, 
although their mean baseline rating was not recorded. This is moderately higher than 
the present discomfort ratings, which were approx. 36 post-task. Kehoe also reported 
subjective anxiety ratings of approximately 26, which were similar to those obtained 
presently. Taken together, the overlap on these three subjective measures across studies 
suggests that the stress induction potential of the current manipulations was no less than 
that obtained with either the CO2 challenge or radiant heat induction. It is important to 
note, however, that there are well-established limitations of subjective measures when 
used as indicators of change in supposed physiological states, and a number of studies 
have employed direct physiological measures as an alternative (e.g., Wilson, 2009).
A central hypothesis of the current research proposed that the increase in stress 
measures would be greater in the Multi-Sentence Condition, relative to the Single-
Sentence, possibly because the former would generate greater vividness and impact of 
the imagined scene. However, none of the three key dependent variables showed any 
notable difference between conditions. The vividness outcome perhaps shed some light 
on this issue, and demonstrated that the mean vividness rating was significantly greater 
in the Multi-Sentence Condition (i.e., 52/100 compared to 30/100). Hence, the vividness 
associated with the longer manipulation was greater than the single sentence alone. 
Interestingly, the larger vividness outcome recorded on the Multi-Sentence Condition 
here was considerably smaller than that recorded by Marcks and Woods (2007) on a 
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single-sentence manipulation (i.e., 69/100). These differences across conditions and across 
studies may be accounted for by differences in participant levels of willingness to engage 
with the scenario. That is, the current data showed significantly greater willingness to 
engage with the scene by the Multi-Sentence Condition (54/100 compared with 27/100), 
which may in turn generate greater vividness. Indeed, although Marcks and Woods used 
only a single-sentence manipulation, they reported high levels of engagement (66/100), 
similar to those observed here. In short, perhaps level of engagement is more influential 
on outcomes than length of manipulation, possibly because it relates to vividness.
The present outcome on believability of the scene supports the argument above 
on vividness. Specifically, the mean believability rating was almost significantly greater 
than the mean in the Multi-Sentence Condition (36/100 compared with 25/100). It would 
seem likely that the greater vividness associated with more sentences also increased the 
believability of the scenario. Interestingly, however, this figure is considerably lower 
than the mean believability of 66/100 reported by Marcks and Wood (2007). 
Rachman et al. (1996) proposed that the presence of negative feelings, such as 
guilt and moral wrongness, may also be critical to attaining increases in stress using 
the single sentence procedure. Although, the current findings showed some superiority 
for the Single-Sentence Condition on guilt (52 vs. 42/100) and moral wrongness (60 vs. 
48/100), the outcomes on both measures for both conditions were high. Furthermore, 
both outcomes were consistent with other studies. Specifically, the guilt outcome was 
similar to Rachman et al.’s 54/100, Zucker et al.’s (2002) 58/100 and Marcks and Woods’ 
(2007) 43/100. The current moral wrongness outcome was also consistent with other 
evidence, with both Marcks and Woods (2007) and Zucker et al. (2002) reporting a 
mean of 52/100. Most notably, all of these outcomes were recorded with single sentence 
manipulations, and the current data indicated that this manipulation was associated with 
greater guilt and moral wrongness than the longer manipulation. As a result, the findings 
here may suggest that one reason why the Multi-Sentence Condition is no more effective 
than the shorter Single-Sentence manipulation is because it begins to reduce feelings 
of guilt and moral wrongness (or generally negative feelings). In other words, perhaps 
the longer manipulation facilitates habituation to stress on participants’ behalf and this 
in turn begins to undermine any potential superiority in outcome.
On a related note, it was interesting that willingness and vividness were significantly 
greater in the Multi-Sentence Condition and believability approached significantly greater, 
than the Single-Sentence Condition. In short, one might assume that greater believability 
and vividness would be associated with less, rather than more, willingness. However, 
if, as suggested above, the longer condition facilitated habituation to stress, then one 
would not be surprised to find that willingness remained high. 
The studies discussed above also shed some light on the unexpected lack of 
difference observed between the two current conditions. Specifically, Rachman et al. 
(1996) proposed that negative appraisals such as guilt and moral wrongness play a 
key role in the impact of the single-sentence stress induction task. Indeed, if guilt and 
moral wrongness exerted an important influence on stress induction and the two current 
conditions did not differ in the levels of stress induction created, then one would expect 
to see similar outcomes for both conditions. In short, the data here support Rachman et 
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al. ’s (1996) proposal and suggest that negative emotions like guilt and moral wrongness 
play a more important role in stress induction than variables like willingness or vividness.
In conclusion, the results obtained from the current study demonstrate the utility 
of Rachman et al.’s original single-sentence paradigm as a brief and robust form of 
experimental stress induction. The present findings suggest the utility of the procedure 
across three self-reported forms of stress. The overlap of outcomes on these measures 
with clinical studies also suggests that the preparation may have utility with both clinical 
and non-clinical samples. Although brief and simple to use, the procedure also appears 
to generate adequate levels of participant willingness, vividness, and believability, as 
well as establishing feelings of guilt and moral wrongness, which may indeed play a 
key role in the induction of stress. The multi-sentence procedure appears to add little to 
most of the measures of stress and negative appraisals, with the exception of vividness 
and willingness, and possibly believability. But, if these differences simply serve the 
purposes of habituation, then for participants this is simply more of the same as that 
generated by the single-sentence procedure. In conclusion, we would suggest that at 
least in terms of the dependent and appraisal variables measured here, the multi-sentence 
paradigm adds little to its shorter counterpart. However, this issue does suggest the 
possible utility of comparing the two procedures on a range of different variables.
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